The Vietnam war – A prelude

The Communist leader of North Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh could hardly have been unaware of Sun Tzu`s dicta when he devised a strategy both for his war of liberation against France and for his war of aggression against South Vietnam, in which the United States was his principal adversary. Although he was unable to prevail in either conflict without giving battle, he or his successors was able in both cases to “exploit and aggravate the inherent frictions within the enemy country” and to “agitate the young against the old”, and in the war with the United States he was also able to “cover with ridicule the enemy’s tradition”. In at least some circles, the North Vietnamese succeeded in changing the long established image of the United States as a champion of liberty into that of a big y power interfering harshly and inhumanely in the internal I affairs of a small nation. In the process, the North Vietnamese I “broke the will of the enemy to fight” and, despite American I victory on virtually every battlefield, emerged in the end I triumphant. Therein lies a cardinal lesson for the democracies. No nation should put the burden of war on its military forces alone. It . matters not whether a war is total or limited; a nation must I be wholly dedicated in its purpose, firm in its resolve, and committed to sacrifice by more than one segment of its society- An the war in Vietnam clearly demonstrated, without that dedication. that resolve, that commitment, no matter what the performance on the field of battle. victory will be elusive.

The interest of the United States in South Vietnam was born Tin the post-World War II era, when Communist movement into insecure and unstable areas around the world appeared to be a monolithic threat. In that atmosphere, President Harry S. Truman in 1947 pledged the nation to unconditional support of free people who are “resisting attempted subjugation by minorities or by outside pressures”. Congress approved that doctrine by a large majority. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his turn emphasized that policy of containment in association with a strategy of massive retaliation. With South Vietnam much in mind, the Eisenhower administration sponsored the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which the Senate in 1955 ratified with only one dissenting vote.

When john F. Kennedy became president, he developed personal interest in the problem posed by a Communist strategy of small wars of “national liberation”. Chastened by failure at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and by a personal confrontation with Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union, the young president reputedly told a correspondent for the New York Times: “We have a problem in making our power pertinent and Vietnam looks like the place.”

President Kennedy set the tone of his administration in his inaugural address, pledging the nation °°to bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend and oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty”. To attempt to foil the Communist strategy of wars of national liberation fitted that ideal. President Kennedy thus sharply increased American involvement in South Vietnam, but in his zeal made the un- fortunate mistake of approving American participation in the overthrow of South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Despite congressional endorsement for military action as Arni as that provided Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy President Johnson was determined to keep the war limited and publicly announced that he would sanction no expansion of it. That locked American military forces into a defensive strategy, and anyone versed in military history knows that a force on the offensive has advantages over one on the defensive; for the force on the offensive possesses the initiative and can mass its strength at the time and place of its own choosing. North Vietnam had the additional advantage of knowing that its operating bases in neighboring Cambodia and Laos and -for the most part- in North Vietnam were virtually. inviolate. Although those of us in Vietnam were acutely conscious that a defensive strategy contributed to a prolonged war, and that a prolonged war contributed to the success of the strategy the enemy had borrowed from Sun Tzu, we were powerless, in view of the political restrictions, tp shift to an offensive strategy and   ‘   the war to a swift conclusion.

Only in the bombing of North Vietnam did President Johnson Sanction an offensive Strategy, and even in that he bowed to political advice and accepted a selective, on—again, off-again campaign reflecting political pressures at home and abroad. To North Vietnam it must have been clear that the bombing demonstrated not strength and determination but political weakness and uncertainty. Actions by vocal elements of American society to frustrate the will of the majority, high- lighted and sometimes glorified by the news media, no doubt helped convey that message. “Illegal war” and “immoral war” became cliches of the times.

In the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, passed by the Congress in 1964 with only two dissenting votes in both houses President Johnson obtained clear authority to commit military forces as he deemed necessary to achieve the national objective of assuring a free and independent South Vietnam; but as the war dragged on without decisive American military action, the mood of the Congress changed, a reflection of public attitudes strongly influenced by the news media, particularly television. When the war became intensely controversial, the president should have asked for reaffirmation each year of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; indeed, congressional leaders should have demanded it. Yet neither the president nor congressional leaders wanted to face open national debate, and a rift between legislative and executive branches of the government was allowed to widen.

Despite. dissent at home and restrictions on military operations against enemy sanctuaries beyond the borders of South Vietnam, American and South Vietnamese military forces by the end of 1967 had achieved substantial progress, both on the battlefield and in establishing security for the South Vietnamese people. Then came the enemy’s Tet offensive of early 1968. Despite the fact that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong incurred a military defeat of such proportions that it took them four years to recover, reporting of the offensive by press and television in the United States gave an impression if not of American and South Vietnamese defeat, then of an end- less war that could never be won. Even a number of senior officials in Washington were deceived, failing to heed the fact  that historically an enemy who is losing may launch a desperate effort to reverse the tide of battle, as in the German offensives of 1918 and in the Battle of the Bulge. Halting the bombing of most of North Vietnam, President Johnson re- moved himself from the political area, which led to political negotiations in Paris; but the negotiations were for long years meaningless, achieving little more than to decide the shape of the conference table. Yet the war went on, and more American soldiers were killed while their enemy ostensibly parlayed peace in Paris than had been killed before the negotiations in Paris began.

Once the North Vietnamese had failed in a major conventional invasion of South Vietnam in 1972 and President Richard M. Nixon had directed a renewed and, finally, intensive bombing campaign against  North Vietnam, the Communist representatives in Paris at long last made some concessions, how- ever minor. They might have been compelled to make more, but under ever—mounting political pressure and agitation, Mr Nixon had already begun pulling out American troops, and he underscored his determination to withdraw whatever the cost by making a major concession: to accept a continued presence of North Vietnamese troops inside South Vietnam.

Despite t hat one-sided concession, the cease-fire agreement reached in Paris early in 1973 was theoretically workable if the threat (and reality) of American airpower remained. By adopting the Case·Church Amendment in the summer of 1973, which prohibited “any funds whatsoever to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by the United States military forces in, over, or from off the shore of North Vietnam, South Vietnam or Cambodia”, the United States Senate took away that threat. Subsequent sharp cuts in military aid to South Vietnam must have reinforced the North Vietnamese leaders in their recognition that the United States on its own volition had executed an act of surrender.

By that time there were still weaknesses in the South Vietnamese government, military leadership, and body politic, but the country had made great strides toward becoming a viable nation and could no doubt have handled any threat of internal subversion alone. Yet the country still faced a powerful external military force entrenched within its borders, and the cut in American aid left South Vietnamese military units short of equipment, ammunition, and replacement parts and virtually devoid of air support, severely impairing morale at all levels. The enemy meanwhile was amply equipped and supplied and remained free to concentrate at the time and place of his choosing. Thus South Vietnam was doomed to eventual defeat. The Leaders in Hanoi had learned Sun Tzu’s dicta well. Having achieved ridicule of their enemy’s tradition, having exploited and aggravated inherent frictions within their enemy’s country, and having agitated the young against the old, they had removed their primary adversary from the fight and were free to exploit their raw military power, with only minimal assistance from the southern revolutionaries, to conquer South Vietnam and impose on the country a harsh Communist regime.

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